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RECENT LEGISLATION 
INSURANCE-STATE REGULATION-UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS FALSE A.Jr 
VERTISING PROCESS Acr-Recent Illinois legislation subjects foreign in-
surers who are not authorized to do business in Illinois and who circulate 
false advertising there to the jurisdiction of the state courts and the State 
Insurance Commissioner. When the Insurance Commissioner is informed 
of false or misleading advertising, he is to notify the supervisory insurance 
official of the domicile state of the foreign insurer. If this notice does not 
result in the cessation of the activity, the Commissioner may proceed 
against the insurer under the state's Unfair Trade Practice Act.1 Since 
the typical mail order insurer will not have agents or property within the 
state, the mere solicitation of business, by mail or otherwise, is made the 
equivalent of an appointment of the Insurance Commissioner as the in-
surer's agent for all service of process. Unauthorized Insurer's False Ad-
vertising Process Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 735.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1961). 
In response to the Supreme Court's decision that interstate insurance 
business was subject to federal regulation,2 Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,3 which provided that continued state regulation of insurance 
was in the public interest and that federal law would be applicable only 
to the extent that such business was not regulated by state law. Each state, 
prompted by this invitation, passed legislation aimed at completely reg-
ulating the insurance industry and thereby precluding the possibility of 
intervention by the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of 
Justice. In FTC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n,4 the Supreme Court held that 
in order for state regulation to preclude FTC jurisdiction, it must be 
regulation in the state where the deception is practiced and has its im-
pact, rather than regulatory legislation in the domicile state of the foreign 
insurer. This holding suggested that the states' efforts to exclude the FTC 
had not been wholly successful, and the decision is at least partially re-
sponsible for the interest in nation-wide passage of the Unauthorized 
Insurer's False Advertising Process Act (UIFAPA) .5 The prospect of gen-
1 ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1028-41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961). Each of the fifty 
states has enacted the equivalent of an Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Illinois ver-
sion provides for a cease-and-desist order and a maximum penalty of $500 for each 
violation. See also CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-15-1 to -13 (1953); N.Y. INs. LAW 
§§ 270-82. 
2 United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court 
thereby overruled the precedents of seventy-five years commencing with the decision in 
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). 
3 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ IOU-15 (1958). 
4 362 U.S. 293 (1960) . 
5 The act was originally drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) which has taken the position that every state must enact the UIFAPA 
if it is to be an effective extension of the Unfair Trade Practices Act and other legisla-
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eral adoption of the UIFAPA poses two questions: first, whether it will 
enable the states to maintain exclusive control of the regulation of mail 
order insurance; and secondly, as a practical matter, whether it will result 
in the effective control of the various deceptive methods used in such 
advertising. 6 
Assuming the constitutionality of the UIF APA service of process pro-
visions, 7 the answer to the first question is largely dependent upon the 
Court's ultimate interpretation of the McCarran Act provision denying 
federal jurisdiction where the particular state has already provided regula-
tion. From a logical and historical standpoint it is arguable that by "reg-
ulation" Congress meant effective, workable controls, as opposed to mere 
legislative enactments.8 Although it seemed to adopt the latter alterna-
tive in FTC v. National Gas. Co.,9 the Court has modified this interpreta-
tion somewhat in the Traveler's Health decision.10 While equating reg-
ulation with legislation avoids the difficulties inherent in determining 
whether or not regulation is effective, it may well be responsible for foster-
ing legislation directed more at excluding the FTC than at providing 
meaningful regulation. If this actually occurs the Court might further 
modify its holding in National Gas. Co., especially since the majority 
opinion in Traveler's Health pointedly left open the question of whether 
tion which serves adequately to regulate authorized insurers. The Commissioners also 
discussed the desirability of inter-state compacts or a re-definition of the concept of 
"doing business.'' See 1 NAIC PROCEEDL'IGS 309, 315 (1961) • California, Maine, North 
Dakota, South Dakota and Nevada have also passed the act. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. 
§ 686.210 (1960). 
6 For a general discussion of the forms and extent of misleading advertising, see 
Mccarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail Order Accident and Health Insurance 
Policies and Advertising, 2!1 INS. COUNSEL J. 82 (1956). 
7 It seems unlikely that the Court will find them unconstitutional as a denial of due 
pi-ocess, for the Court has indicated that the states' interest in the regulation of insur• 
ance business within their borders warrants the application of a very liberal due process 
requirement. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). However, 
since McGee involved suit on an insurance contract, and the problem here is one of 
jurisdiction for administrative control, it is arguable that the same result should not 
necessarily follow. It should also be pointed out that the same provisions for substituted 
service which might be sufficient in this act would probably not suffice in other contexts. 
Sec Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 2!15 (1958); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959). 
s See 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945) where Senator McCarran states that only effective 
regulation will preclude federal intervention. It has been argued, however, that the 
legislative history will support either conclusion, and that practical and political con• 
sidcrations will influence the result. See Layne, Multiple State Regulation of Mail 
Order Insurance, !19 GEo. L.J. 422 (1951) . 
o 357 U.S. 560 (1958). 
10 Since regulation by the domicile state, if exercised, would be effective, the possi• 
bility of less than full use of this power would seem to be the only logical basis for 
a distinction between regulation of that type and regulation by the state of "impact." 
ITC v. Traveler's Health Ass'n, !162 U.S. 293 (1960) . 
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or · not legislation in states where advertising is received will divest the 
FTC of jurisdiction.11 
Even if the Court continues to disregard the effectiveness of legislation 
in drawing the jurisdictional line, the problem must be faced in another 
respect. The same factors which the Court might consider in determining 
whether or not state regulation is effective and therefore exclusive, must 
be considered in answering the question of whether or not the UIF APA 
will assure adequate means of coping with the manifold problems of reg-
ulating mail order insurance. Regulation incapable of enforcement is 
mere chimera. The Unfair Trade Practices Acts generally provide for a 
cease-and-desist order and a penalty for .non-compliance. The state may 
sue on. its, own statute in the domicile state, or it may first reduce the 
penalty to a judgment in its own courts and sue on it in the insurer's 
domicile. Whether or not enforcement is possible depends on the extent 
to which the t~ndency persists to deny full faith and credit to foreign penal 
statutes and to foreign judgments based on penal statutes.12 By inference 
the Supreme Court has limited the exception to criminal statutes,13 and 
there is no logical reason for its perpetuation. The Court has recognized 
the states' interest in the regulation of insurance in deciding other issues,14 
and it probably would hesitate to render these endeavors meaningless as a 
regulatory tool on the strength of this attenuated doctrine. Since the Con-
stitution does not forbid states to enforce judgments of sister states based 
on penal statutes, interstate compacts requiring the enforcement of such 
judgments are a possibility. However, the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners has discouraged such a proposal, not on the grounds 
that it would be ineffective, but because a request for congressional con-
sent would supposedly be inconsistent with states' contention that they are 
capable of regulating insurance without any interference by the federal 
government, because the Supreme Court would have the power to pass on 
the meaning and validity of such a compact, and because it is less likely to 
be universally adopted.15 Much of this reasoning seems to be predicated 
11 The dissent in Traveler's Health disputes the assertion by the majority that there 
is any question to leave open: "Yet even if such legislation proved abortive as a practical 
matter ... such legislation would nonetheless presumably exclude Federal Trade Com-
mission jurisdiction, unless we were to depart from our holding in FTC v. National 
Casualty Co., to the effect that it is the existence of state regulatory legislation, and not 
the effectiveness of such regulation, that is the controlling factor." FTC v. Traveler's 
Health Ass'n, supra note 10, at 305 n.4. 
12 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Generally laws are 
classified as penal when the recovery provided for is not determined by the injury suf-
fered, and when liability is not dependent upon whether or not the plaintiff was preju-
diced by the defendant's non-compliance. Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 188 (1957). 
· 13 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ; Huntington v. Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
14 See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
15 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 309, 315-16 (1961). 
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on the assumption that securing exclusive state regulation is of more vital 
concern than securing efjective regulation. 
Even if all legal obstacles to effective state regulation are removed, a 
practical problem remains: many of the states lack the ability to deal effec-
tively with the evil this statute purports to control.16 To be truly effective 
the regulation must be prospective, eradicating misleading advertising 
and policies before the insured are injured. While FTC procedures are 
prospective,17 most states act primarily on a complaint basis.18 Inadequate 
budgets, small staffs, and dated administrative machinery constitute severe 
limitations on the ability of smaller states to regulate satisfactorily,19 and 
there is no present indication of any major attempt to remedy these condi-
tions. Since the protection of the public should be of more concern than 
the exclusion of the FTC, much might be said for a co-operative system in 
which the states continue their traditional regulatory and licensing activity 
but allow the FTC to combat the problem of restraining advertising of 
mail order companies before it causes injury. Unfortunately co-operation 
along these lines appears politically impossible20 and in the final analysis 
the interests of those likely to be injured by the deceptive practices of mail 
order insurers appear to weigh less than the demand for freedom from 
federal intervention. The concept of due process must initially be stretched 
to allow this type of state regulation,21 and the extension of state juris-
dictional power is unobjectionable only if it actually serves to benefit citi-
zens. Thus, the individual states will have the responsibility of bridging 
a potential gap between the intended effect of the legislation and its prac-
tical impact, and of proving that their jurisdictional triumph was not 
their citizens' loss. 
Chester A. Skinner 
16 See, e.g., Kimball, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 142 
(1961); Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry, 
67 YALE L.J. 452 (1958) . 
17 See Mccarter, supra note 6, at 100-01. 
18 Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry, 67 
YALE L.J. 452, 459 (1958). 
10 Kimball, supra note 16, at 142, 199. 
20 Until the Court declared that the business of insurance was commerce in the 
South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n case, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the states alone had been 
responsible for insurance regulation. The various state insurance commissioners and 
staff members naturally feel that they have a vested interest in maintaining state 
hegemony in this area. Their arguments in support of maintaining complete control 
often do not rest on a reasoned comparison of state and federal regulation, but rather 
on references to the seemingly inherent evils of centralization as compared with the mani-
fest justice of states' rights. See McConnell, State Regulation v. State Regulation Plus 
Regulation by Multiple, Decentralized, Independent Federal Agencies, 1956 INS L.J. 697. 
21 See note 7 supra. 
